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each of those cases, logistical conve-
nience and a specific political interest 
were the determining factors for inter-
vention� If a merchant vessel possesses 
strategic interest, its flag has never pre-
vented the U�S� Navy from taking action�
Currently, almost 75 percent of the 
world’s global trading merchant fleet 
is registered with ten flag states� Of 
these ten, only those of Greece and the 
People’s Republic of China are consid-
ered “national flags�” The remaining 
64 percent of these commercial ships 
are registered in Panama, Liberia, the 
Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malta, the Bahamas, or Cyprus� Rough 
Waters fails to consider or identify the 
impacts of shifts in global trade and 
trade economics, technology, and ship 
ownership, construction, financing, 
and crewing, which are the realities 
that underlie the choice of a flag state� 
Very few ships are owned by “pure” 
U�S� companies, and the global use 
of global flags did not cause the col-
lapse of the U�S� merchant marine�
SCOTT BERGERON
Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military 
Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016� 256 pages� 
$39�95�
This is a quirky yet ultimately enjoyable 
book� The association of the author, 
Barton Whaley, with the U�S� intelligence 
services dates back to the Korean War� 
He earned his undergraduate degree 
from Berkeley and his PhD from MIT� 
Over the course of his career Whaley 
worked with or for the U�S� Army, 
the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
the director of national intelligence� 
A� Denis Clift, president of the Na-
tional Intelligence University, referred to 
Whaley as “the undisputed dean of U�S� 
denial and deception experts�” Whaley 
died in 2013, leaving behind several 
completed volumes and a legacy as a 
man with a passion for and an encyclo-
pedic knowledge of military deception�
A central assumption of Practise to 
Deceive is that the only tool that has a 
hope of “dispelling the fog of war” is  
intelligence—but it is the task of the 
deception planner to keep that fog 
thick� When deception planners do 
their job right, the enemy must deal 
with uncertainty, and surprise can 
be achieved� This is not exactly new 
ground� Many students of history, as 
well as most current members of the 
national security enterprise, are aware, 
at least to some degree, of famous 
deception operations� These range from 
the Trojan horse of Odysseus to the 
deployment of the imaginary First U�S� 
Army Group to southeast England in 
the months before D-day 1944� Whaley 
reminds us that deception plans do not 
just appear; they are the brainchildren 
of talented individuals—the deception 
planners� Practise to Deceive neglects 
neither deception plans nor deception 
operations, but its primary intent is to 
shed light on those planners and how 
they think. As it turns out, that is a 
pretty tall order� In addition, Whaley 
tells readers they should walk away 
with an awareness of the threats that 
enemy deception efforts pose and how 
we can improve our own efforts�
Unfortunately, the book’s structure 
does not lead the reader to a 
rapid understanding of the mind of 
the deception planner� Indeed, most 
readers, particularly those unfamiliar 
with the subject, will be well served to 
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read the executive summary first to 
get some understanding of the nature 
of deception in all its many aspects�
The book also contains a discussion of 
the personality type of the successful 
deception planner� Readers will not be 
surprised to learn that such persons 
differ greatly from successful military 
commanders� Those commanders 
are vital, however, as they possess the 
power to approve the deception plan, 
must play an active role in deception 
planning to increase the odds of success 
and victory, and often serve as a bridge 
between the freewheeling planner and 
the more rigid military hierarchy� A 
short introduction and part 1, written 
in Whaley’s own voice, lay out his ideas 
about the commander, the deception 
planner, and the deception plan�
Part 2, the heart of the book, consists 
of eighty-eight individual case studies 
of deception operations� Arranged 
thematically, the cases range chrono-
logically from the biblical period to 
the modern day, and in scope from 
brief tactical encounters to drawn-out 
strategic operations on a massive scale�
The cases themselves are something 
of a hodgepodge� Some, such as the 
decision by Sir Garnet Wolseley to 
approach Egyptian defenses at Tel el 
Kebir at night, are only a few paragraphs 
in length� Others are painfully sparse 
on information, such as the case study 
that consists merely of an acknowledg-
ment that Admiral William F� “Bull” 
Halsey had a “dirty tricks department�” 
In contrast, other case studies are very 
detailed with regard to personalities and 
actions� Among these is an excellent 
look at Operation BOLO, designed by the 
legendary Colonel Robin Olds, USAF, 
who used electronic deception to lure in 
North Vietnamese MiGs with Air Force 
Phantoms� The action is described in de-
tail, as is the personality of Colonel Olds�
As with Olds, Whaley is not shy about 
discussing the personal character and at-
tributes of many of the officers featured 
in the case studies� Douglas MacArthur 
is acknowledged for mastering the 
Machiavellian art of “divide and con-
quer” among his subordinates� General 
Orde Wingate and T� E� Lawrence both 
are identified as “duplicitous�” Several 
individuals are examined at different 
points in their careers, allowing the 
reader to appreciate their approach to 
deception operations over time� These 
include the actor Douglas Fairbanks 
Jr� when serving as a USN lieutenant 
commander during 1944 in Italy� Also 
covered are Fidel Castro, First Lord of 
the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and 
Ian Fleming’s older brother, Peter�
Part 3 of Practise to Deceive lays out a 
rather detailed approach to planning a 
deception operation and a discussion 
of the major factors to be considered� 
These include such topics as policy 
constraints, the relationship of com-
manders to their staffs, and various 
cultural factors� Two actual examples of 
deception plans are provided: the first is 
the deception plan the Germans created 
to support Operation BARBAROSSA; the 
second is a British tactical-level plan that 
Peter Fleming authored to support op-
erations against the Japanese in Burma�
It is easy to see how, in the hands of a 
lesser author and editor, Practise to De-
ceive could lose an audience rapidly� But 
Whaley’s passion for deception shines 
throughout the book, and over time 
the author’s dry and ready wit becomes 
more and more pronounced, to good 
effect� Readers who, on the basis of prior 
experience, expect compilations of many 
case studies to be dull and plodding 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   7 8/7/17   11:58 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 14
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/14
 1 4 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
examples of the writer’s art will be pleas-
antly surprised, for thought-provoking 
and fascinating assertions abound� For 
example, Whaley believes that some 
societies are more deceptive than others, 
“but only during any given slice of time�” 
Deception is also, according to Whaley, 
a mind game that can be learned, 
although certain types of people, 
including magicians and practical jokers, 
may find the game easier to master�
Despite taking the reader on a 
rather fast-paced ride over centuries 
of deception efforts, Whaley makes 
several points with care� The first is that 
deception operations are not guaranteed 
success� Two failures cited are the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, for which Whaley holds 
CIA veteran Richard Bissell responsible, 
and the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue 
mission, with Jody Powell coming in 
for censure� The second point is that 
deception operations are not important 
in and of themselves; they are only as 
important as the degree to which they 
support the commander’s operational 
plan and allow the attainment of desired 
objectives� As we face a future in 
which deception operations can be 
expected to flourish, Whaley’s caution-
ary note is well worth remembering�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the 
Emerging US-China Rivalry, by Lyle J� Goldstein� 
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ� Press, 2015� 
400 pages� $29�95�
Numerous Western observers—expert 
and otherwise—have opined about the 
implications of the rise of China� A 
small number address the implications 
for hundreds of millions of people 
who have moved from subsistence 
living into the middle classes� A few 
more address the consequences for the 
world’s economy, environment, or rule 
of law� But most focus on an emerging 
rivalry with the United States and the 
possibility it will lead to superpower 
conflict� Of these, Naval War College 
professor Lyle Goldstein is virtually 
alone in mapping out specific plans 
to avoid friction, de-escalate tensions, 
and cultivate peaceful coexistence; the 
others offer “realist” solutions designed 
to isolate, deter, or defeat China�
Dr� Goldstein—the founding director 
of the College’s China Maritime Studies 
Institute, and fluent in Mandarin—
brings the right tools to the task of 
analyzing the United States–China 
rivalry and setting a course toward 
peaceful coexistence� A political 
scientist with strong appreciation for the 
influence of history on strategy, he has 
read widely in Chinese and English to 
understand how academics and leaders 
in each country view their nation’s 
experience, interests, and destiny� By 
sorting out these perspectives, Goldstein 
works like a mediator to chart the 
narrow and winding pathways to trust 
and cooperation� He dedicates nine 
chapters to distinct issues that divide the 
United States and China, categorized by 
region (for instance, Japan or the South 
China Sea) or by sector (the economy or 
the environment)� After describing the 
overall picture, each chapter examines 
interpretations in the West and then in 
China, offering particularly valuable 
insights into the perspectives of Chinese 
military and strategic thought leaders�
Having toured the strategic horizon 
and explained the relevant attitudes 
and interests, the author then lays out 
“cooperation spirals”—plans whereby 
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